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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Stanford credit towards his

$500,000 limited guaranty, and a discharge of his guaranty obligation, for the $750,000 in
personal payments he made to the Parks pursuant to his guaranty where courts have
uniformly held that a guarantor should receive credit for payments he personally makes to
a lender.
On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of
appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. In the context of a summary judgment
motion, which presents a question of law, this Court employs a correctness standard and
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to Stanford as the non-moving party. Dowling v. Bulleiu 2004 UT 50, f 7, 94 P.3d 915.
Stanford preserved this issue for appeal below during briefing and a hearing before
the trial court. (R. 155; 159; 168-171; R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 1-4; 9-11; 25-26.)1

1

Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "R." is the abbreviated reference
to the record on appeal, "Ex." refers to an exhibit included in this briefs addendum, and
"Op." refers to the Court of Appeals5 opinion in this case.
1

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding there were no disputed

issues of fact as to whether Stanford had directed that his payments to the Parks be
applied towards his $500,000 limited guaranty where the evidence demonstrates that the
Parks demanded that Stanford pay them pursuant to his guaranty once Snowmass
defaulted, where Stanford paid the Parks over $750,000 of his personal funds, where
Stanford alerted the Parks that he was paying them in his caipacity as guarantor and not as
Snowmass, where Stanford paid the Parks with a cashier's or personal check, and where
none of Stanford's payments to the Parks came from a Snowmass bank account.
On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of review used by the Court of
Appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. In the context of a summary judgment
motion, which presents a question of law, this Court employs a correctness standard and
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to Stanford as the non-moving party. Dowling, 2004 UT 50.
Stanford preserved this issue for appeal below during briefing and a hearing before
the trial court. (R. 155; 159; 168-171; R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 1-4; 9-11; 25-26.)
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
No Constitutional or statutory provisions are dispositive for purposes of resolving
the questions presented on appeal.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court: should a guarantor be

denied credit for payments he personally makes to a lender under a limited guaranty. In
this case, Stanford gave a maximum guaranty of $500,000 on a corporate borrower's
debt. When the borrower, Snowmass Corporation, failed to fulfill its obligation, the
Parks demanded payments from Stanford as guarantor and Stanford paid the Parks over
$750,000 of his own funds to honor his limited guaranty. Notwithstanding Stanford's
payments were in excess of his personal guaranty, and which payments should have
discharged his personal guaranty, the Parks sought, and received, a judgment against
Stanford for an additional amount in excess of one-million dollars. In total, Stanford has
paid, or has become obligated to pay, approximately $1.75 million on a $500,000
guaranty, an amount which the Court of Appeals upheld.
II.

Course of Proceedings
The Parks initiated this case by filing a Complaint against Stanford seeking to

recover $500,000 plus interest pursuant to Stanford's guaranty. The Parks pursued this
claim against Stanford even though Stanford had already paid them over $750,000,
despite having guaranteed a maximum of $500,000 of Snowmass' debt.
Soon after filing their Complaint, the Parks moved for partial summary judgment
seeking a determination that: (1) Stanford was liable to them based upon his guaranty, and
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(2) Stanford was not entitled to offset over $750,000 in personal payments against that
guaranty.
The Parks filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking a final judgment
against Stanford based on his guaranty. Stanford opposed the Parks' motions claiming
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether his personal payments to the
Parks should be credited towards his personal guaranty. Hearings on the Parks' summary
judgment motions were held before Judge Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court on
March 13, 2006 and April 29, 2008.
HI.

Disposition Below
At the March 13, 2006 hearing, Judge Quinn concluded as a matter of law that

none of Stanford's payments could be applied towards his $500,000 guaranty. Judge
Quinn stated that since there was no evidence that Stanford had directed the Parks to
apply his personal payments towards his guaranty, he was not entitled to an offset of those
payments as matter of law. The court issued an order reflecting this ruling. (A copy of
this order is included in this briefs addendum as Exhibit "A.")
At the April 29, 2008 hearing, Judge Quinn granted the Parks' motion for
summary judgment and entered judgment against Stanford in the total amount of
$1,009,872.35 despite the fact that Stanford had previously paid over $750,000 of his
personal funds to the Parks. (A copy of the Judgment is included in this briefs addendum
as Exhibit "B.") The judgment was comprised of $500,000 in principal, $508,463.91 in
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interest on the principal amount, and $1,408.44 in costs. Stanford filed a notice of appeal
on July 2, 2008.
On October 29, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the
trial court's ruling that Stanford was not entitled to credit payments he made to the Parks
against his limited personal guaranty. (A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion is
included in this briefs addendum as Exhibit "C")
In its ruling, the court held that a guarantor cannot be given credit for payments he
makes to a lender unless the parties had previously agreed how the guarantor's payment
should be applied. In support of this new rule, the Court of Appeals adopted Lee v. Yano,
997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), a case which presented entirely different facts from
the present case. In its decision, the court also rejected the rule set forth in analogous
cases that a guarantor should receive credit towards his guaranty for payments he makes
directly to the lender.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held as matter of law that there was no evidence in
the record that Stanford and the Parks had an agreement in place as to how the Parks were
to apply Stanford's payments.
IV.

Statement of Facts
A.

Stanford's Involvement in the Parks' Real Estate Transaction

1.

On April 1, 1994, Gary B. Stanford ("Stanford") and Richard Buckway

("Buckway") entered into a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") with Kang and
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Marsha Park (the "Parks") to purchase a commercial real estate property (the "Property").
(R.210.)
2.

As part of the REPC5 Stanford and Buckway agreed to assume the Parks'

obligation on a Security Mutual Life Insurance Company Deed of Trust debt ("Security
Mutual Note") which encumbered the Property. (Op. at ^f 2.)
3.

In October of 1994, the parties agreed that Snowmass, LC ("Snowmass")

would replace Stanford and Buckway as the purchaser of the Property. (R. 202.)
4.

The Parks' attorney prepared a Trust Deed Note dated July 1, 1995, which

limited Stanford's personal guaranty liability to $500,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
(R. 4.)
B,

Stanford's Personal Payments to the Parks Pursuant to his Guaranty

5.

After taking possession of the Property, Snowmass began making payments

to the Parks pursuant to the REPC. (R. 202.)
6.

In 1994 and 1995 Snowmass missed several of its payments. (R. 159; 203-

7.

When Snowmass failed to make these payments, Mr. Park contacted

205.)

Stanford directly to demand payment based on Stanford's personal guaranty. (R. 205;
211-261.)
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8.

Mr. Park sent twenty letters to Stanford requesting that Stanford personally

make Snowmass' payment to the Parks pursuant to Stanford's personal guaranty. (R.
241-261.)
9.

Park's letters are not addressed or directed to Snowmass, but rather to

Stanford and Buckway in their capacity as personal guarantors of Snowmass' debt. (R.
241-261.)
10.

In response to Park's letters, and to honor his personal guaranty, Stanford

made payments to the Parks in excess of $750,000. These payments were made to fulfill
the Parks' obligation under the Security Mutual Note, Snowmass' obligation under the
Security Mutual Note, Snowmass' payment obligation under the 1995 Trust Deed, and
Stanford's guaranty of the July Trust Deed. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.)
11.

When Stanford sent payments to the Parks in response to their demand, he

did so using personal checks from his personal checking account rather than checks
drawn on Snowmass' checking account. (R. 270-273.)
12.

On some of the checks he sent to the Parks, Stanford wrote the notation

"Gary Stanford" to signal that the payments were from him personally and not Snowmass.
(R. 274.)
13.

At times Stanford would transfer his own funds into Snowmass' bank

account so that Snowmass could make its payment to the Parks. (R. 159.)
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14.

None of the payments Stanford made to the Parks came from Snowmass'

funds, but rather all of them came from Stanford's personal funds in accordance with his
guaranty.
15.

Stanford believed that his personal payments to the Parks would be credited

towards his guaranty. (R. 161; 207.)
16.

Had Stanford known that the Parks were not crediting his personal

payments towards his guaranty, Stanford would not have paid the Parks over $750,000 of
his own money. (R. 161; 207.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Stanford was not entitled to credit the
$750,000 in payments he made to the Parks and a discharge of his $500,000 guaranty
unless there was an express agreement providing for such credit. Stanford contends that
this ruling should be reversed for three reasons.
First, as courts in numerous analogous cases have done, Utah should adopt a rule
which grants guarantors credit for payments they make to lenders pursuant to their
guarantees. Second, the court denied Stanford credit for his payments to the Parks based
on its adoption of a rule set forth in a case where the question was whether a third-party
guarantor could control a lender's application of a borrower's payment, as opposed to the
facts of this case where Stanford is seeking credit for payments he personally made to the
Parks. And third, by denying guarantors credit for payments they make to lenders, the
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court has adopted a rule which will have a chilling effect on lending practices within this
State by prejudicing guarantors.
The Court of Appeals also erred by ruling that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether there was an agreement between the Parks and Stanford which
required that Stanford's $750,000 in payments be applied towards his $500,000 limited
guaranty. The record is replete with facts which show that the Parks demanded payment
from Stanford in his personal guarantor capacity, that Stanford paid the Parks in his
personal guarantor capacity, and that the Parks knew that Stanford was paying them as a
personal guarantor and not as Snowmass. These facts should have precluded the Court of
Appeals' ruling that Stanford was not entitled to credit for the payments he made to the
Parks as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
L

STANFORD, LIKE OTHER GUARANTORS, SHOULD RECEIVE
CREDIT FOR PAYMENTS THEY MAKE TO A LENDER
PURSUANT TO THEIR LIMITED GUARANTY

The Court of Appeals should have adopted a rule of law in this State which
requires a lender to give a guarantor credit towards his personal guaranty for payments the
guarantor, and not the primary borrower, makes to the lender. In denying Stanford credit
and a discharge for the payments he made to the Parks, the Court of Appeals relied on the
general rule that a guarantor cannot control the application of a borrower's payment to a
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lender unless there is an agreement regarding such application. This ruling is erroneous
in three respects.
First, the court should have adopted the rule announced in analogous cases that a
guarantor should receive credit for his payments to a lender. Second, the court's holding
relies on a rule which is inapplicable to the present case. And third, the court's ruling will
have a profoundly prejudicial effect on lending practices within this State.
A.

The Court Of Appeals Should Have Adopted The Rule That A
Guarantor Should Receive Credit For Payments He Makes To A
Lender Pursuant To His Guaranty

In cases where a guarantor, and not the borrower, makes a payment to a lender,
courts have consistently given the guarantor credit for his payments. In such cases, the
courts' inquiry is not on whether the guarantor and lender have an agreement as to how
the guarantor's payments will be applied. Rather, the courls' inquiry is on whether the
guarantor made the payment to the lender and whether the lender knew it was receiving
payments from the guarantor. In denying Stanford credit for his payments to the Parks,
the Court of Appeals disregarded these cases without any substantive analysis or
discussion.
The Court of Appeals first minimized the facts and legal issue presented in
Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. McDonald 147 A. 627 (N.J. 1929). In Monmouth,
the issue was whether a guarantor had satisfied his limited guaranty obligation when he
made personal payments to the lender in an amount exceeding his limited guaranty. The
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Monmouth court concluded that where the guarantor had made payments directly to the
lender, the lender was required to offset those payments against the guarantor's guaranty.
Id. at 628. The fact that the guarantor made the payment was the critical inquiry in the
court's analysis, and not whether the guarantor and lender had an agreement controlling
application of the guarantor's payment. Monmouth was the only case presented by either
party which presents similar facts and legal issues to this case.
As in Monmouth, Stanford guaranteed a borrower's (Snowmass) debt to a lender
(the Parks). (R. 4.) As in Monmouth, Stanford's guaranty was limited to a fixed amount
of $500,000. (Id.) As in Monmouth, Snowmass was unable to make the payments to the
Parks. (R. 205; 211-261.) As in Monmouth, the Parks requested that Stanford make
Snowmass' payment as its guarantor. (Id.) As in Monmouth, Stanford made payments to
the Parks on behalf of Snowmass with his own money in order to honor his personal
guaranty. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) As in Monmouth, the amount Stanford paid to the
Parks exceeded his guaranty maximum of $500,000 where he paid them in excess of
$750,000. (Id-) And as in Monmouth, the Parks brought an action against Stanford for a
debt which Stanford has already paid.
Stanford contends that Monmouth provides the proper analysis for deciding this
case. As set forth above, the facts are nearly identical to those of this case where the issue
is whether Stanford extinguished his $500,000 limited guaranty obligation by paying the
Parks $750,000 of his own funds. As in Monmouth, the controlling fact in this case is
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that Stanford, not Snowmass, made the payments to the Parks and therefore Stanford
should receive credit for those payments and a discharge of his debt. The Court of
Appeals' requirement there be an agreement in place between the Parks and Stanford is
irrelevant in light of the fact that Stanford, as a personal guarantor of Snowmass, made
the payments to the Parks. Monmouth provides the most helpful analysis for this case and
pursuant to Monmouth, the Court of Appeals should have given Stanford credit for his
$750,000 payments to the Parks.2
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' newly adopted rule that an agreement must exist
between the parties before a guarantor can receive credit for his payments to a lender is
contrary to the general rule stated in other significantly analogous cases.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. Dakota Elec. Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22 (8th
Cir. 1962), the Eight Circuit reiterated the general rule that a borrower may direct how his
payment is applied if he communicates that intent before or at the time of payment. Id. at
25. The court noted that if the borrower fails to so indicate, the lender may apply the
payment however she wants. Id. Judge Blackmun, writing for the Eight Circuit, noted

2

The Court of Appeals dismissed Monmouth without any consideration or analysis.
The court's reason for this was that "no court in any jurisdiction has cited Monmouth for
any purpose, let alone for the rule that Stanford suggests." (Op. at ^f 13.)
While it is true that Monmouth has not been cited by other courts, it has also not been
overturned within its own jurisdiction or called into question in any other jurisdiction.
The fact that no court has cited Monmouth is not a sufficient basis for ignoring its clear
applicability to the present case.
12

that an exception to these general rules applies where the guarantor himself makes a
payment to the lender. Id.
The St. Paul court emphasized that when a guarantor makes payments to a lender
on behalf of a borrower, that fact is the equitable circumstance which justifies an
exception from the general rules governing the application of payments. Rather than
focusing on whether the parties had an agreement as to how the guarantor's payments
would be applied, the court focused on whether it was the guarantor who made the
payments, and if so, whether the lender knew the payment it received came from the
guarantor. Id.3
The Court of Appeals' requirement that Stanford and the Parks have an agreement
controlling how parties should apply Stanford's payments is erroneous in light of both
Monmouth and St. Paul. As Judge Blackmun wrote, the guarantor receives credit for his
payment to the lender if the lender knows the payments came from the guarantor. As set
forth infra in section II, the record is replete with evidence that the Parks knew that the
payments Stanford made were from Stanford and not from Snowmass. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals erred in not only requiring that an agreement be in place for Stanford to

3

The Court of Appeals' analysis of St. Paul was limited to a footnote wherein the
court stated that St. Paul is inapplicable because it has "different facts than in this case."
(Op. at f 8, n.3.) The court did not consider Lee to be unpersuasive based on its admitted
"different factual scenario." (Id. at ^f 13.)
13

receive credit for his payments, but in also ignoring the evidence that the Parks knew
Stanford was personally making payments as a guarantor.
Both Monmouth and St. Paul set forth the rule the Court of Appeals should have
adopted in this case. Like this case, those cases involve guarantors seeking credit for
payments they themselves made, rather than trying to control how a lender applied a
borrower's payment. Pursuant to Monmouth, once Stanford paid the Parks $500,000, his
guaranty liability was extinguished. And pursuant to St. Paul the Parks should have
credited Stanford for his payments when the evidence demonstrates that the Parks knew
Stanford made the $750,000 of payments as Snowmass' guarantor.4 The Court of
Appeals' errors should therefore be reversed.
B.

The Court Of Appeals Has Adopted A Rule In This State
Governing A Guarantor's Payments Which Is Based On A Case
Where, Unlike This Case, The Issue Was Whether A Guarantor
Could Control A Lender's Application Of A Third-Party
Borrower's Payment

The Court of Appeals erred in deciding this issue of first impression by basing its
opinion on Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000). In adopting Lee, the court
stated that it believed that "the rule stated therein regarding application of payments from

4

See also Hyland Elec. Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Construction Corp., 378 F.2d
134, 139 (2d Cir. 1967)(stating that when a creditor knows the surety is the source of
funds it receives from a debtor, the creditor must apply those funds to the guaranteed
debt); Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. Moran Construction Co., 296 N.W.
761 (Neb. 1941) (holding that a lender must apply a debtor's payment to guaranteed debt
if the lender knows that the guarantor is the source of those funds.)
14

a guarantor to a lender should be adopted in Utah." (Op. at f 13.) The problem with
adopting this rule is that Lee did not involve the question of how a lender should aply a
guarantor's payment. Rather, the issue was whether a guarantor could control how a
lender applied a third-party borrower's payment. The Court of Appeals' oversight of this
critical factual difference tainted its holding.
In Lee, an ex-husband had two separate debts with the plaintiff and gave a
promissory note guaranteed by Francis Yano ("Yano"), who promised to pay the plaintiff
on one of those debts. Id. at 70. The ex-husband eventually failed in his obligations and
the plaintiff brought an action seeking payment from Yano as guarantor. Id. at 71-72.
Yano contended that the plaintiff should have applied her ex-husband's payments to the
debt which Yano had guaranteed rather than the other debt which he had not guaranteed.
Id. at 70.
On appeal, the Hawaii Court of Appeals noted that in the case of a debtor and
creditor "[i]t is elementary that in the absence of agreement, and in the absence of
direction from the borrower, the creditor may apply payments [from the borrower] to any
obligation he holds. Equally clear, if there be no provision to the contrary, the debtor may
designate the application of payment and the creditor must comply with such direction."
Id. quoting Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. McCormick. 102 F.2d 305, 315 (1939).
Using this language, the Hawaii court held that since there was no evidence of any
specific agreement covering the application of payments on the ex-husband's debts or
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evidence that the ex-husband instructed the plaintiff to apply his payments to the part of
his debt guaranteed by Yano, the Plaintiff was authorized to apply her ex-husband's
payments in any manner she wished, even to Yano's detrimient. Id. at 149-150. The court
then stated that general rule that "a third person who is secondarily liable on a debt, such
as a guarantor . .. cannot control the application which either the debtor or the creditor
makes of a payment, and neither the debtor nor the creditor need apply the payment in the
manner most beneficial to such persons." Id at 150.5
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Lee is misplaced. Lee's rule is appropriate in
cases where a borrower makes a payment to a lender and a guarantor requires that the
lender apply the borrower's payment to the guarantor's guaranteed debt. Lee is not
instructive, however, in cases such as this one where a guarantor is seeking credit for
payments he himself makes to a lender. If Stanford was trying to control the Parks'
application of payments which Snowmass made then the Lee ruling would be appropriate.
However, those are not the facts of this case,6
5

The Lee court cites the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mid-Continent Supply Co. v.
Atkins & Potter Drilling Corp., 229 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1956), wherein the court stated the
general rule that where a creditor holds different obligations of a debtor, some of which
are guaranteed by third-parties, unless otherwise directed by the debtor, the creditor may
apply the proceeds of a payment made by the debtor to the obligation or obligations not
guaranteed. 229 F.2d at 76 (emphasis added).
Like Lee, Mid-Continent Supply Co. is inapposite to this case where Stanford is
not seeking to direct application of payments Snowmass made towards his guaranty, but
rather, Stanford is seeking credit for payments he himself made as guarantor.
6

The Court of Appeals noted that Lee "involved a slightly different factual
scenario," yet failed to recognize the implications of those factual differences. (Op. at f
16

By adopting Lee as the rule of law in Utah, the Court of Appeals has set a legal
precedent which does not address the facts of the cases it purports to resolve. While
Stanford does not dispute the correctness and reasoning behind the Lee rule, Stanford
does dispute its application to the present case. If allowed to stand, the Court of Appeals'
decision is useless in future cases involving a guarantor seeking credit for payments he
makes directly to a lender because Lee is not premised on a guarantor making the
payment. The Court of Appeals has established a precedent which prejudices all
guarantors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed.
C

The Court Of Appeals' Adoption Of The Lee Rule Will Have A
Chilling Effect On Lending Practices Within This State

The Court of Appeals should also be reversed where its decision will have severe
lending policy implications. The Court of Appeals' decision denies a guarantor any credit
for payments it makes pursuant to the guaranty unless the guarantor either inserts
language into the guaranty specifying that his payments will be applied towards his
guaranty or tells the lender each time he makes a payment that he wants it credited
towards his guaranty. Both of these requirements will have a chilling effect on lending
practices because guarantors will be weary of guaranteeing loans.
These new requirements saddle guarantors with the responsibility of ensuring that
their payments are credited to their guaranty. Stanford contends, however, that such

13.)
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requirements are illogical. Guarantors enter into guarantees assuming that their payments
will be applied towards their guarantees. And no guarantor makes personal payments to
the lender believing the lender will not credit the payment towards his guaranty. If the
Court of Appeals' ruling stands, guarantors in this State now have no assurance that their
payments will be credited towards their guaranty amount. Moreover, lenders may now
refuse to credit a guarantor's payments by simply alleging lhat the guarantor never told
them he was making the payment pursuant to his guaranty.
There should be no other way to interpret a guaranty than the guarantor should
receive credit against his guaranty for his personal payments. The Court of Appeals'
ruling opens the door to sharp lending practices which may cause guarantors to lose
millions of dollars in payments they reasonably expect the lender to apply to their
guaranty. Stanford contends that such a result would not only be inequitable, but would
also dissuade individuals from ever guaranteeing a loan, thereby preventing lenders from
making loans. These policy reasons demand that the Court of Appeals' decision be
reversed.
II.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE
PRECLUDED THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE
PARKS AND STANFORD DID NOT HAVE AN AGREEMENT
REGARDING STANFORD'S PAYMENTS

The Court of Appeals erred in both adopting and applying Lee. As set forth above,
the court should not have relied on Lee in deciding this case. However, even if Lee was
the appropriate rule of law in this case, the facts of this case did not support a grant of
18

summary judgment on the question of whether the Parks should have applied Stanford's
payment to his guaranty.
In the context of summary judgment, this Court "view[s] the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Dowling, 2004 UT 50, ^ 6. The Court of Appeals justified its ruling by stating
that "even assuming that Stanford intended that these payments be credited towards his
guaranty, there is no record evidence that he and the Parks had agreed to do so." (Op. at f
14.) That is simply not the case. Pursuant to the relevant standard of review, the Court of
Appeals' decision should be reversed.
In this case, the facts show that the Parks knew that Stanford was the source of
over $750,000.00 in payments to them, or at the very least, the facts demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. The record is replete with evidence that the
Parks knew that Stanford was paying them in his guarantor capacity and not as
Snowmass. Once Snowmass was delinquent with its monthly payments to the Parks, Mr.
Park contacted Stanford to request that he honor his guaranty and make the payments on
behalf of Snowmass. (R. 1; 205; 241-261.)
Additionally, the record contains twenty separate letters that Mr. Park wrote to
Snowmass' guarantors, Stanford and Buckway, demanding immediate payment. (R. 241261.) In each of those letters, Mr. Park addressed Stanford and Buckway who were the
guarantors of the loan rather than Snowmass who was the obligor. (R. 241-261.)
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While Mr. Park did not specifically address Stanford and Buckway as "guarantors"
in his letters, at least part of the reason he addressed his letters to them personally, rather
than to Snowmass, was to demand payment from them individually by virtue of being
guarantors. The Parks5 letters to Stanford and Buckway demanding payment is exactly
the type of action one takes when the primary borrower has failed to make a payment, the
creditor demands payment from the guarantors.
Furthermore, when Stanford sent payments to the Parks he often did so using his
personal checks, rather than checks drawn on Snowmass' bank account. (R. 270-273.) A
few of the checks Stanford sent were cashier's checks which included the notation "Gary
Stanford" on the check. (R. 274.) One of the cashier's checks made payable to Mr. Park
had the notation "Snowmass Highland/ Dr. Stanford." (R. 275.) And just one check had
the notation "Snowmass" on it. (R. 276.) These checks, none of which was drawn on a
Snowmass account, weakens any argument the Parks have made that Stanford was paying
them in any other capacity than as Snowmass' guarantor.
The fact that Mr. Park sent Stanford and Buckway a letter each time Snowmass
was delinquent with its payment is evidence that the Parks were demanding payment from
Stanford as a guarantor. The fact that Stanford sent money to the Parks using his own
personal checks rather than Snowmass checks is evidence that the Parks knew Stanford
was paying them as a guarantor. The Parks never received any payment from Stanford
drawn on a Snowmass account. Stanford has also alleged that Mr. Park demanded that
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Stanford pay him based on Stanford's personal guaranty. (R. 205; 211-241.) The
cumulative effect of these facts is that the Parks knew the payments they received from
Stanford came from him in his capacity as an individual guarantor, and not on behalf of
Snowmass.
Moreover, as detailed above, the proper analysis was whether the Parks knew the
payments Stanford was making were in his individual capacity and not as Snowmass.
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the Parks knew Stanford
was making payments to them in his personal capacity as guarantor and the Court of
Appeals' holding otherwise should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stanford respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
Court of Appeals' decision.
DATED this fr& day of April, 2010.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
"**r' ; w i " - , - ^ ^ ^,—~°>C—

Russell S. Walker
Reid W. Lambert
Anthony M. Grover
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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October 29, 2009, Utah Court of Appeals Opinion

Exhibit B:

June 5, 2006, Order

Exhibit C:

June 3, 2008, Judgment
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EXHIBIT "A"

f MB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Keith W Meade (Bar No 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P C
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801)532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiffs

JUN - 5 2006
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.
0eputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KANG S PARK and MARSHA PARK.
Plaintiff,
vs

ORDER
Civil No 050900073

GARYB STANFORD,

judge Anthony B Quirui

Defendant

This matter came before the Couit on Monday, March 13, 2006, at 9 00 a m The plaintiff
was represented by counsel Keith W Meade The defendant was lepresented by counsel M Darin
Hammond
The Court, having consideied the pleadings filed in connection with the plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, including all of the affidavits filed by the defendant, and having considered
the discussion of counsel, and otherwise being advised in the matter, and for the additional reasons
articulated by the Court dunng the course of the heating,
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS
1.

The Court determines, as a mattei of law, that none of the payments made to date by

Gaiy Stanford or Snowmass can be applied so as to reduce the $500,000 00 personal guaianty from
Stanford to the plaintiffs

2.

The Court believes, at present, that it cannot determine as a matter of law that there

would not be a deficiency judgment in favor of Security Mutual should Snowmass, LLC default on
its obligation to Security Mutual, and for that reason, the Court denies the balance of the plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment, which requested a determination of the principal amount which
remains owing on the defendant's personal guaranty.
DATED this

_*2

day of March? 2006.
BY THE COURT:

ithony B. Quinn
;
District (26urt Judge
'

APPROVED AS TO FORM A N D CONTENT :

/I

/ M. Darin Hammond
Smith Knowles
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, on the p e p

day of March, 2006, to the following:

M. Darin Hammond
SMITH KNOWLES
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403

EXHIBIT "B"

FILEB BISTRICT COUBT
Third Judicial District

JUN - 3 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By_

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
keiih@crslaw. com
OF
OP JJUDGMENTS
UUUIVICIN i o
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Deputy Clerk-

-«•<«.,.?

DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KANG S. PARK and MARSHA PARK,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 050900073

GARY B. STANFORD,

Judge: Anthony B. Quinn

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on Tuesday, April 29, 2008. The plaintiffs
were represented by counsel, Keith W. Meade, of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. The defendant was
represented by counsel, M. Darin Hammond, of Smith Knowles.
The Court, having considered the pleadings filed by the parties, as well as pleadings
previously filed in this matter, as well as the argument of counsel, and having determined that there
are no genuine issues of material fact based upon the pleadings previously filed and filed in
connection with this motion,
Judgment @J

050900073

STANFORD,

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows
1.

The plaintiffs be and hereby are awarded judgment against the defendant, Gary B

Stanfoid in the following amounts:
a

$500,000 00 principal,

b

$285,401 98 in accrued interest on principal through January 31,
2008,

c

$190,722 95 in accrued interest on delinquent payments thiough
January 31, 2008, and

d

$5,842 98 in accrued interest on late fees, said amount taking into
consideration the $5,000 00 reduction set foith in the plaintiffs7
January 3, 2007 Memorandum, and

e

$14,169 00 in additional accrued interest on pnncipal thiough Apnl
30, 2008; and

f

$12,627 00 in additional accaied mteiest on delinquent payment
through April 30, 2008

The total of the foregoing is $1,008,463 91, togethei with judgment at the default late provided in
the Note of 15% per annum, plus costs of collection
2.

hi addition, the plaintiffs have submitted a Memorandum of Costs, and the plaintiffs

aie further awarded those costs in the amount of $1,408 44

2

3

The TOTAL JUDGMENT is $ 1,009,872 35 plus interest at the default rate of 15%

per annum as provided for in the guaranteed note and writ of collection, all until paid
4

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs endoTseon the face nf the ouginal Note

given by Snowniass, LLC to Secuuty Mutual Life Lnsuiance Company the following 'The right to
obtain a deficiencyjudgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to the judgment entered
in Civil No 050900073 in the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, State of Utah in the mattei
entitled Kavg S Pcukand Mcusha Pcukx Gary B Stanford" The cudoisement shall be placed on
the Note as reflected in Exhibit "A" attached to this Judgment
DATED thib ^ 7

day of Ivfery, 2008
BY THE COURT-™^ .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undei signed heieby certifies that a true and conectcop} oi the foregoing JUDGMENT
)
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the CA,

day of May, 2008, to the following

M Darin Hammond
SMITH KNOVVLES
4723 Harrison Blvd , Suite 200
Ogden. UT 84403

EXHIBIT "C"

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Kang S. Park and Marsha Park,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

OPINION
For Official Publication)
Case No. 20080574-CA
F I L E D
(October 29, 2009)

Gary B. Stanford,
Defendant and Appellant.

2009 UT App 307

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050900073
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
Attorneys:

Russell S. Walker, Reid W. Lambert, and Anthony M.
Grover, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Keith W. Meade and Bradley M. Strassberg, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thorne.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Appellant Gary B. Stanford appeals the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Kang S. and Marsha
Park. In particular, Stanford argues that summary judgment was
inappropriate because the amount of his liability on the guaranty
was ambiguous and because the trial court erred in determining
that he was not entitled to credit toward his personal guaranty
for payments he made prior to this action. Stanford also argues
that even if summary judgment was appropriately granted, we
should remand for the trial court to reduce the judgment entered
against him in light of Utah Code section 57-1-32. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2
The Parks owned commercial real estate in Ogden, Utah (the
Property) that, as of March 1994, was encumbered by a trust deed
securing an obligation of Kang S. Park to Security Mutual Life
Insurance Company with a balance owed of approximately
$266,484.40 (the Security Mutual Note). In April 1994, Stanford
and Richard Buckway entered into a real estate purchase contract

with the Parks (the REPC) whereby they agreed to pay $1,000,000
to the Parks to purchase the Property.1 In conjunction with the
REPC, Stanford personally guaranteed "the payment of $500,000
plus interest." He also assumed liability on the Security Mutual
Note. After execution of the REPC, the parties continued to
negotiate terms for the sale of the Property, ultimately
resulting in a trust deed and note executed July 1995, (the 1995
Trust Deed Note), between the Parks as lenders and Snowmass, LC -a Utah limited liability company of which Stanford was a member-as Borrower. Snowmass also assumed liabiLity on the Security
Mutual Note. In the 1995 Trust Deed Note, Stanford again
personally guaranteed partial payment:
Stanford agrees to unconditionally guarantee
the payment of th[e 1995 Trust Deed N]ote,
but in no event shall . . . Stanford's
liability (excluding portions thereof
attributable to interest and costs) when
added to any deficiency judgment which may be
entered against him by virtue of his guaranty
of the Security Mutual [Note] (excluding
interest and costs), exceed the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50 0,000).
%3
In 1997, the parties amended the 1995 Trust Deed Note to
provide that any notices of default could be sent directly to
Stanford. When Snowmass missed several payments, the Parks sent
Stanford requests for payment. These payments were ultimately
made. After Snowmass further "defaulted in a number of material
respects, including the failure to make payments under the [1995
Trust Deed] Note," the Parks filed suit against Stanford seeking
specific performance of his personal guaranty.
f4
The trial court held three separate hearings--March 2006,
February 2007, and April 2008--in an attempt to resolve the
Parks' various motions for summary judgment. At the beginning of
the March 2 0 06 hearing, the trial court noted that after reading
the parties' memoranda, it was uncomfortabLe granting summary
judgment because (1) Stanford's guaranty in the 1995 Trust Deed
Note was "ambiguous, especially as it relates to how the Security
Mutual [N]ote is handled," and (2) it appeared that there may be
questions of fact regarding "whether or not Mr. Stanford should
have credit for sums that were paid prior to th[e] time where
demands were made directly to him as opposed to [Snowmass]."
Stanford bought the Property with his business partner at
that time, Richard Buckway. However, Buckway is not a party to
this appeal and, for the reader's convenience, has been omitted
from this opinion except where necessary for clarity.
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After further argument by both parties, the trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the Parks, deciding that
whether Stanford was entitled to credit for past payments is
purely a question of law and that Stanford was not entitled to
credit for these payments because he failed to notify the Parks
that he intended them to be credited against his personal
guaranty. The trial court refused to grant full summary
judgment, however, due to issues involving the Security Mutual
Note. The trial court ultimately granted the Parks' request for
full summary judgment at the April 2 008 hearing because Bank of
Utah, as custodian for the Kang S. Park IRA, had purchased all of
Security Mutual's interests under the Security Mutual Note and
agreed to waive any deficiency judgment thereunder to which they
might otherwise be entitled. As a result, Stanford had no
potential liability on the Security Mutual Note. 2 Because the
amount owing under the 1995 Trust Deed Note was undisputedly in
excess of $500,000, the trial court entered judgment in favor of
the Parks for $500,000 in principal plus interest, fees, and
costs, totaling $1,009,872.35. Stanford appeals.

ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
i|5
The thrust of Stanford's appeal is that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because either the court made
legal errors or there existed material factual disputes
precluding summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriately
granted where there are no material facts in dispute and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
"[A] motion for summary judgment may not
be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity
exists in the contract [at issue] and there is a factual issue as
to what the parties intended." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002
UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
"review[] a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or
denial of summary judgment for correctness, and view[] the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,
% 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

2

The Judgment ordered the Parks to endorse the Security
Mutual Note as follows: "The right to obtain a deficiency
judgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to the
judgment entered" in this case.
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A.

Integration

%6
Stanford contends that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that the 1995 Trust Deed Note is fully integrated, arguing that
several documents evidencing the parties1 negotiations should be
included in interpreting Stanford's personal guaranty.
Specifically, Stanford argues that these documents demonstrate
that the parties intended to limit the amount of his guaranty to
a maximum of $500,000 inclusive of interest, fees, and costs.
Because parol evidence is not allowed to interpret an integrated,
unambiguous agreement, the first step in deciding whether to
consider extrinsic evidence is determining whether the 1995 Trust
Deed Note is integrated. See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren,
2008 UT 20, f 11, 182 P.3d 326.
To determine whether a writing is an
integration, a court must determine whether
the parties adopted the writing as the final
and complete expression of their bargain.
Importantly, . . . when parties have reduced
to writing what appears to be a complete and
certain agreement, it will be conclusively
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the
writing contains the whole of the agreement
between the parties.
Id. % 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, the
supreme court reiterated that "[wjhether a contract is integrated
is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Id. % 10.
Notwithstanding that standard of review, the Tangren court noted
that extrinsic evidence would be allowed on the issue of
integration, despite "a clear integration clause, where the
contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in
consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress,
mistake, or illegality." Id. K 15. The Tangren court further
disavowed prior cases that may have allowed extrinsic evidence
outside the enumerated types of allegations, holding that "we
will not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be
considered on the question of integration in the face of a clear
integration clause." Id. U 16.
f7
Before the trial court, the Parks argued that the 1995 Trust
Deed Note was fully integrated, particularly in light of the
following clause:
This [1995 Trust Deed] Note has been issued
pursuant to and is secured by that certain
Deed [entered contemporaneously with the 1995
Trust Deed Note] between Borrower and Lender
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(the "Security Instruments"). Such Security
Instruments and all other instruments
evidencing or securing the indebtedness
hereunder are hereby made part of this Note
and are deemed incorporated herein in full.
Stanford's argument, in part, is that prior writings and
negotiations between the parties should be admitted to determine
the extent of Stanford's guaranty. Under Tanqren, this type of
extrinsic evidence is not admissible where the agreement appears
on its face to be integrated.
%Q
Stanford further argues, however, that the 1995 Trust Deed
Note was not fully integrated, but instead, by its express terms,
the 1995 Trust Deed Note "incorporated" all the documents
previously entered into between the parties, including a series
of letters sent by the Parks' attorney prior to execution of the
1995 Trust Deed Note. Stanford further contends that these
letters render his guaranty liability amount ambiguous because,
in contrast to the 1995 Trust Deed Note, the letters appear to
cap Stanford's guaranty liability at $500,000 inclusive of
interest, fees, and costs. Stanford also appears to argue that
the prior letters constitute "other instruments evidencing or
securing the indebtedness hereunder," as stated in the 1995 Trust
Deed Note.
^|9
While the trial court did not explicitly find that the 1995
Trust Deed Note was integrated, it implicitly did so. The 1995
Trust Deed Note--and the "other instruments evidencing or
securing the indebtedness [t]hereunder"--"appears to be a
complete and certain agreement," see id. % 12, between the Parks
and Stanford regarding Stanford's personal liability.
Accordingly, we "conclusively presume[] . . . that [it] contains
the whole of the agreement between the parties." See id.
Furthermore, the prior letters are not instruments securing the
debt as is the contemporaneous trust deed. At best, they reflect
negotiations culminating in and replaced by the 1995 Trust Deed
Note and address the same types of terms as those ultimately
included in the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Having determined that the
trial court did not err in finding the 1995 Trust Deed Note to be
integrated, our discussion turns to a correctness review of the
trial court's interpretation of the 1995 Trust Deed Note.
B.

Ambiguity and the Parties' Intent

flO Once a court has determined that a contract is fully
integrated, it may not rely on parol evidence in making its
initial decision of whether the contract is facially ambiguous.
See id. % 11. "A contractual term or provision is ambiguous 'if
it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because
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of uncertain meanings of terms, missing tearms, or other facial
deficiencies. 1 " Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, % 25, 190 P. 3d
1269 (quoting WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv, Corp., 2002
UT 88, % 20, 54 P.3d 1139). If the contract is facially
unambiguous, we are bound to determine the parties' intent solely
"from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Flores v.
Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, 1 8, 209 P.3d 428 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, when reviewing a trial court's
interpretation of a contract, "'we defer to the trial court on
questions of fact but not on questions of law. 1 " Id. i| 7
(quoting Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 1 14, 48 P.3d
918). And finally, "[w]hether a contractual term or provision is
ambiguous on its face is a question of law f " to be reviewed for
correctness. Id. (citing Daines, 2008 UT 51, % 25) .
fll Stanford's contention regarding ambiguity in the 1995 Trust
Deed Note focuses on integration and the parties 1 prior
negotiations and letters: Stanford makes no extensive argument
that the language within the four corners of the 1995 Trust Deed
Note renders his personal guaranty amount ambiguous. The
guaranty provision in the 1995 Trust Deed Note clearly states
that Stanford's liability will be $500,000
exclusive of interest,
fees, and costs. Because none of the terms in the guaranty
provision are "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies," see Daines, 2008 UT 51, 1 25 (internal
quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the guaranty provision
in the 1995 Trust Deed Note is unambiguous as a matter of law.
Summary judgment on this issue was therefore proper.
Furthermore, because there is no dispute that the amount owed
under the 1995 Trust Deed Note exceeded $500,000, we determine
that Stanford's personal liability was correctly calculated at
$500,000 plus interest, fees, and costs, for a total of
$1,009,872.35.
C.

Credit for Past Payments

^|12 Stanford also argues that the trial court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that he was not entitled to credit toward
his personal guaranty for payments he made prior to the filing of
this action. Stanford asserts that "[w]hen [he] made personal
payments to the Parks, he did so believing that the Parks would
credit those payments toward [] his [personal] guarant[y] ."
Implicit in this argument is the notion that Stanford made these
payments in his capacity as a guarantor, as opposed to in his
capacity as Snowmass's sole member. Whether Stanford is entitled
to credit for these payments against his personal guaranty, based
on his unexpressed belief that these payments would be so
credited, presents an issue of first impression in Utah.
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i|l3 Stanford cites Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v McDonald, 147
A. 627 (N.J. 1929), arguing the rule m Utah should be that "when
a guarantor makes a payment directly to the lender, that payment
is credited against the guarantor's guaranty limit " However, as
the Parks note m their brief, no court m any jurisdiction has
cited Monmouth for any purpose, let alone for the rule that
Stanford suggests. Alternatively, the Parks cite Lee v. Yano,
997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), and argue that the rule stated
therein regarding application of payments from a guarantor to a
lender should be adopted m Utah. In Lee, the Hawaii Court of
Appeals cited secondary sources for the proposition that,
11

[a] s a general rule, a third person who is
secondarily liable on a debt, such as a
guarantor, surety, or mdorser, cannot
control the application which either the
debtor or the creditor makes of a payment,
and neither the debtor nor the creditor need
apply the payment in the manner most
beneficial to such persons "
Id. at 76 (quoting 60 Am. Jur 2d Payment § 88 (2003))
Although
Lee involved a slightly different factual scenario, we believe
that this statement of the law is persuasive and should be
adopted as Utah law. Exceptions to this rule may exist, as
acknowledged by the Parks, where there is a differing contractual
provision or an agreement to accept payment from a guarantor upon
the express condition that it be applied toward the guaranty
amount, notwithstanding the principal debtor's continued
vitality. Thus, because Stanford, as guarantor, cannot
unilaterally control the way m which these payments were treated
by the Parks, the relevant inquiry is whether he and the Parks
had an agreement regarding acceptance of these payments and their
specific application.
fl4 However, even assuming that Stanford intended that these
payments be credited toward his guaranty, there is no record
evidence that he and the Parks had agreed to do so
In fact, the
undisputed facts of record belie such an assertion, most notably:
(1) in 1997 the parties amended the 1995 Trust Deed Note so as to
allow notices of default to be sent to Stanford's personal
attention; (2) from 1998 on, Stanford was the sole member of
Snowmass; (3) although payments were made, some allegedly with
money from Stanford's personal account, the Parks had no
knowledge that Stanford intended these payments to be directed
toward his personal guaranty; and (4) there was no agreement by
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the Parks to apply the payments to Stanford's guaranty.3
Consequently, we affirm the trial court's determination that
Stanford is not entitled to credit toward his personal guaranty
for these payments.
II. Utah Code section 57-1-32
Hl5 Stanford argues that even if we affirm the trial court's
grant of summary judgment, Utah Code section 57-1-32 requires
that we remand this case to the trial court so that it may offset
the fair market value of the Property against the judgment.
Stanford did not preserve this argument be Low, but argues that we
should nevertheless review it due to exceptional circumstances.
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, HH 11-12, 10 P.3d 346
(reaffirming that "the exceptional circumstances exception is
ill-defined and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The exceptional
circumstances to which Stanford refers incLude that the facts
implicating section 57-1-32 did not arise until after the
judgment in this case was entered. Thus, Ln order to evaluate
whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify our review of
this unpreserved argument, we must first determine whether
section 57-1-32 applies to the facts of this case.
^16

Section 57-1-32 states, in pertinent part,
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust desed as
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and
57-1-27, an action may be commenced to
recover the balance due upon the obligation
for which the trust deed was given as
security, and in that action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness that was secured by the trust
deed, the amount for which the property was
sold, and the fair market value of the
property at the date of sale. Before
3

Stanford cites St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Dakota Electric Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962), and
Central Blacktop Co. v. Town of Cicero, 519 N.E.2d 972, 976 (111.
App. Ct. 1988), arguing that "when a lender accepts a payment
from a guarantor, and knows that the payment has come from the
guarantor, the lender is required to apply that payment toward[]
the guarantor's debt." (Emphasis added.) These cases are
distinguishable because both were brought to recover under
construction-related payment bonds and have different facts than
in this case.
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rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value of the property at the date
of the sale. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with interest,
costs, and expenses of sale, including
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the property as of the
date of the sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2008) (emphases added).
fl7 We conclude that section 57-1-32 is not applicable. The
Property was subject to two trust deeds: the first was to secure
the Security Mutual Note, the second is the subject of this
lawsuit and secures the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Although Stanford
was a guarantor of both trust deed notes, this action involved
only the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Eventually, Bank of Utah
succeeded Security Mutual on the Security Mutual deed and
conducted a foreclosure sale. Because that foreclosure was on
the first trust deed, not the second trust deed involved in this
case, section 57-1-32 is not implicated. That section places
limitations on a deficiency action after a trust deed sale. See
id. Bank of Utah and the Parks waived any right to seek a
deficiency judgment against Stanford related to the foreclosed
Security Mutual deed, so Stanford is precluded from invoking
section 57-1-32's protections and certainly cannot do so in this
action involving a different obligation. We accordingly conclude
that there are not exceptional circumstances sufficient to
justify our review of this otherwise unpreserved argument. See
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11.
CONCLUSION
fl8 We find no clear error in the trial court's implicit finding
that the 1995 Trust Deed Note was integrated with respect to
Stanford's personal guaranty. We also determine that the
guaranty provision in the 1995 Trust Deed Note is unambiguous as
a matter of law and, therefore, consideration of parol evidence
is improper. We further conclude that Stanford is not entitled
to credit against his personal guaranty for payments made to the
Parks prior to this action because there is no evidence that the
Parks agreed to such an arrangement and he cannot otherwise
control the application of these payments. As a result, the
trial court appropriately granted summary judgment for the Parks.
Finally, exceptional circumstances do not exist sufficient to
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justify our review of Stanford's argument regarding application
of Utah Code section 57-1-32. Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
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WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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